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Abstract
We develop a job-market signaling model where signals may convey two pieces
of information. This model is employed to study the GED exam and coun-
tersignaling (signals non-monotonic in ability). A result of the model is that
countersignaling is more expected to occur in jobs that require a combination
of skills that diﬀers from the combination used in the schooling process. The
model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED:
(i) it signals both high cognitive and low non-cognitive skills and (ii) it does not
aﬀect wages. Additionally, it suggests modifications that would make the GED
a more eﬀective signal.
I Introduction
Most of the existing signaling models are structured in a way that signals reveal
information monotonically. In the job-market models, for example, higher edu-
cation always discloses information about higher productivity. Nevertheless, in
many situations signals convey information about diﬀerent characteristics. In
such cases, good and bad characteristics may be revealed by the same signal so
that the monotonicity does not hold (i.e., signals may be mixed).
One example of mixed signals is the General Educational Development (GED)
exam, which is taken by high school dropouts to certify their equivalence with
high school graduates. The GED reveals, at the same time, high cognitive skills
and low non-cognitive skills [Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001 and Cavallo, Heck-
man, and Hsee, 1998]. Moreover, wages received by high school dropouts are
not influenced by the realization of this exam.
Another example is the occurrence of countersignaling, where individuals
with high types choose to engage in a lower amount of signaling than medium-
type individuals. In the context of education as a signal, for example, mediocre
individuals appear to educate more than bright individuals for professions where
individuals without a licence are not denied work [Hvide, 2003].1 Unlike stan-
dard models of advertising as a signal predict, Clements [2004] documents that
many higher-quality products are sold in lower quality packages. In the pres-
ence of countersignaling, a higher amount of signal may reveal good or bad
information (since high-type and low-type individuals signal less than interme-
diate types).
A third example of mixed signals is presented by Drazen and Hubrich [2003],
where it was argued that higher interest rates show that the government is com-
mitted to maintaining the exchange rate fixed, but also signal weak fundaments.
In the initial papers in the signaling literature, the informational asymmetry
consisted of a unidimensional parameter which was known only to one side of
the market [e.g. Spence, 1973, 1974]. Then, under the natural condition that
individuals could be ordered according to their marginal utility of signaling
(single-crossing property), there existed a family of separating equilibria, all
ranked by the Pareto optimality criterion.2 Moreover, only the Pareto dominant
equilibrium was robust to competition among firms [Riley, 1979].
Of course, the possibility to reduce all asymmetry to a unidimensional pa-
rameter is not a very realistic assumption. In the labor market model, for
example, this implies that all relevant characteristics of an employee could be
captured by a single ability-type, usually thought as a cognitive ability. How-
ever, there is significant empirical evidence on the importance of non-cognitive
skills as well as cognitive skills in the labor market. Apparently, it was as-
sumed that the generalization of the original results to the multidimensional
1A signiﬃcant amount of the 400 richest people in the US do not hold an academic degree
(Bill Gates is a well known example) [Orzach and Tauman, 2004]. Hvide [2003] also argues
that many bright MBA students from top-schools dropout to work.
2 In the specific case of labor market model, this condition implies that education is more
costly to less able individuals.
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case would be straightforward. This assumption was soon proved wrong by
Kholleppel’s [1983] example of a two-dimensional extension of Spence’s model
where no separating equilibrium existed.
Quinzii and Rochet [1985] and Engers [1987] provided suﬃcient conditions
for the existence of a separating equilibrium in the multidimensional model. In
Quinzii and Rochet’s article, ability was represented by a k-dimensional vector
and they assumed the existence of k (non-exclusive) diﬀerent types of education.
Moreover, they assumed that the signaling costs were linear and separable in the
signals (up to a change of variables). Hence, it was as if each school required only
one type of ability. Then, an individual would be able to attend a school whose
system required only a type of skill (cognitive skills, for example) and another
school that required only another type of skill (non-cognitive skills). Under this
separability assumption (which implies in the single-crossing property in each
dimension), Quinzii and Rochet obtain results similar to the unidimensional-
characteristic models: only separating equilibria exist and wages are monotonic
in the characteristic parameter.
It is needless to say that the educational systems assumed by Quinzii and Ro-
chet are not realistic since all known educational systems require both cognitive
and non-cognitive abilities (although in diﬀerent proportions). Engers relaxed
this assumption through a generalization of the unidimensional assumption that
individuals’ marginal utility of signaling could be ordered (single-crossing prop-
erty). However, in the multidimensional case, this assumption is much less
compelling since, as the number of signals rise, it becomes more probable that
the single-crossing property (SCP) does not hold when one controls for one
signal (i.e., the introduction of other signals may break the SCP in the multidi-
mensional case).
Hence, the existence of mixed signals contrasts strongly with monotonic
wages and separability of types in equilibrium as predicted by standard models.
Indeed, when the single-crossing property holds, an equilibrium always exists,
signals are always monotonic, and all equilibria are fully-separable.3 Thus, in
order to understand non-monotone signals, the SCP must not be imposed.
In this article, we present a two-dimensional characteristics signaling model
where the SCP may not hold. Individuals’ characteristics are represented by
a vector of cognitive and non-cognitive ability parameters. Firms can access a
combination of these characteristics through an interview but cannot precisely
tell if the realization of this interview was due to high cognitive or non-cognitive
ability. Workers are able to signal their characteristics through the number of
years dedicated to education.
This model is employed in order to understand the evidence on the GED
and on countersignaling. When applied to the GED, the signaling equilibrium
has some interesting properties consistent with the available empirical evidence:
individuals with diﬀerent abilities obtain the same amount of education and
passing the exam does not increase one’s earnings even though it signals higher
3Araujo, Gottlieb, and Moreira [2004a] show that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
full-separability is that the SCP holds locally.
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cognitive skills. These results follow from the fact that GED is a mixed signal:
if a worker with low overall ability has passed the exam, it means that his non-
cognitive ability is low. Hence, as both types of ability are used in the production
process, passing the exam is not necessarily a signal of high productivity.
The model suggests that the problem of the GED exam is its focus on cog-
nitive ability. A test which places a stronger emphasis on non-cognitive ability
would be a more eﬀective signal. Moreover, a simple change in the passing
standards of the GED would not aﬀect its neutrality on wages.
It is shown that countersignaling occurs whenever the schooling technology
diﬀers from the technology of firms. The model has a very intuitive testable im-
plication: the amount of countersignaling is strictly increasing in the diﬀerence
between the schooling technology and the firms’ technology. Hence, countersig-
naling is expected to be more important in occupations that require a diﬀerent
combination of skills from those required in the schooling process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The basic framework is pre-
sented in Section II.  Section III characterizes the equilibrium.  Section IV dis-
cusses how c ount ersignaling may emerge and S ection V e mploys this framework
to understand the GED exam. Then, Section IV concludes.
II The basi c f ramework
The economy consists of a continuum of informed workers who sell their labor
to uninformed firms. Each worker is characterized by a two-dimensional vector
of characteristics (ι, η), where ι is her cognitive ability (intelligence) and η is
her non-cognitive ability (perseverance). The set of all possible characteristics
is the compact set Θ ≡ [ι0, ι1] × [η0, η1] ⊂ R2++ and the types are distributed
according to a continuous density p : Θ → R++, which is assumed to be a C2
function.
Workers are able to engage in a schooling activity y ∈ R+ which firms
can observe. By engaging in such activity, the type-(ι, η) worker incurs in a
cost c (ι, η, y). Her productivity depends on the vector of innate characteristics
which is not (directly) observable.
Firms have identical technologies with constant returns to scale f (ι, η) and
act competitively.4 Moreover, other than schooling, firms have an interview
technology g (ι, η) which is a non-suﬃcient statistic for the worker’s productiv-
ity. Thus, even though firms have some idea of the overall ability of a worker,
they are unable to unambiguously determine her productivity.5 In a more gen-
eral model, we could imagine that individuals might exert eﬀort in order to
distort the market’s assessment of their productivity [e.g. Holmstrom, 1999 and
Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole, 1999]. This possibility is studied at Araujo,
4 In this paper, we consider only the pure signaling case since schooling does not influence
productivity. However, as was shown in a previous version of the paper, all propositions in
this paper also hold when schooling aﬀects productivity [see Araujo, Gottlieb, and Moreira,
2004b].
5The hypothesis that firms can access an additional signal which consists of a measure of
the worker’s ability is also present at Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To [2002].
3
Gottlieb and Moreira [2004b], where it is assumed that schooling distorts the
worker’s performance in the interview. However, most of the results in this
paper still hold.6
After observing schooling y and the result of the interview g, each firm oﬀers
a wage w (y, g). Thus, each worker will choose the amount of schooling y in order
to maximize w (y, g)− c (ι, η, y) .
The timing of the signaling game is as follows. First, nature determines each
worker’s type according to the density function p. Then, workers choose their
educational level contingent on their type. Subsequently, firms oﬀer a wage
w (y, g) conditional on observing (y, g) .
Since all firms are equal, we will study symmetric equilibria where the oﬀered
wage schedule is the same for every firm. As usual, we adopt the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium concept:
Definition 1 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) for the signaling game is
a profile of strategies {y (ι, η) , w (y, g)} and beliefs µ (· | y, g) such that
1. The worker’s strategy is optimal given the equilibrium wage schedule:
(ι, η) ∈ argmax
{ι˜,η˜}
w (y (˜ι, η˜) , g (˜ι, η˜))− c (ι, η, y (˜ι, η˜)) ,
2. Firms earn zero profits: w (y (ι, η) , g (ι, η)) = E [f (ι, η) | g, y] .
3. Beliefs are consistent: µ (ι, η | y, g) is derived from the worker’s strategy
using Bayes’ rule where possible.
Next, we will specify the analytical forms of the functions presented.7 Con-
sider the following cost of signaling function:
(1) c (ι, η, y) =
y
ιη
.
The cost function above implies that intelligence and perseverance are im-
perfect substitutes in the schooling process.
We assume that the interview function is given by
(2) g (ι, η) = αι+ η,
where α > 0 is the rate of substitution between perseverance and intelligence.
Substituting (2) into (1), we are able to rewrite the cost of signaling as a
function of the intelligence and the interview result:
c (ι, g, y) =
y
ι (g − αι) ,
where we denote this function by c with some abuse of notation.
6 It can also be shown that, locally, the ability to distort the result of the interview raises
the amount of education in equilibrium for all individuals.
7The robustness of the model is studied in the Appendix A.
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Notice that, in general, the single-crossing property (SCP) may not be sat-
isfied since
cyι (ι, g, y) = −
g − 2αι
[ι (g − αι)]2
½
>
<
¾
0⇔ ι
½
>
<
¾
g
2α
.
The SCP states that the marginal utility of eﬀort is monotonic in the ability
parameter. In this specific case, it means that, conditional on the interview g,
more intelligence would either always decrease or always increase the cost of
schooling.8 Hence, the SCP is equivalent to assuming that the range of abilities
is such that intelligence is always better than perseverance for schooling (or
vice-versa).
The intelligence level ι = g2α divides the parameter space in two intervals
(CS+ and CS−) according to the sign of cyι (negative and positive, respec-
tively). For workers with intelligence below (above) g2α , intelligence decreases
(increases) the cost of signaling given the overall ability g. When the SCP is
satisfied, [ι0, ι1] belongs to one of these intervals.
Figure 1
We assume that the worker’s productivity is given by the Cobb-Douglas
function
f (ι, η) = ιbη1−b,
where b ∈ (0, 1). If b > 12 we say that the firm’s technology is intensive in
cognitive skills. Otherwise, we say that it is intensive in non-cognitive skills.
It is useful to rewrite the production function conditional on the interview
g as
(3) s (ι) = ιb (g − αι)1−b .
8 In other words, even for individuals with very high intelligence and very low perseverance
levels, raising a unit of intelligence and decreasing α units of perseverance would decrease the
marginal cost of schooling (or the opposite case when the sign of cyι is reversed).
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III The signaling equilibria
In this section, the signaling equilibrium is characterized. First, we divide the
interval of parameters in three diﬀerent sets according to the degree of sepa-
ration. Necessary conditions for an equilibrium are presented for each of these
sets separately. Then, we present the refinement criterion which will be em-
ployed in order to select a unique equilibrium. It consists of a generalization of
Riley’s [1979] criterion. Subsequently, suﬃcient conditions for the equilibrium
are obtained.
The following definitions will be useful in the characterization of the equi-
libria.
Definition 2 Given an equilibrium profile of education y, the pooling set Θ (y, g)
is the set of types whose signal is (y, g).
We say that a type is separated if, in equilibrium, her characteristics are
revealed from her signals y and g. If more than one type choose the same
amount of education, we say that they are pooled. As in standard signaling
models, an equilibrium may feature a continuum of types choosing the same
signal. We call these types continuously pooled. However, when the single
crossing property does not hold, the equilibrium may feature non-monotone
signalling. As a result, a disconnected set of workers may acquire the same level
of education. We say that these workers are discretely pooled. We state the
precise definitions below:
Definition 3 Given an equilibrium profile of education y:
1. A type− (ι, g) worker is separated if Θ (y (ι, g) , g) = {(ι, g)}. A separating
set is a set of types where every element is separated.
2. A type− (ι, g) worker is continuously pooled if Θ (y (ι, g) , g) is not dis-
crete. A continuous pooling set is a set of types where every element is
continuously pooled.
3. A type− (ι, g) worker is discretely pooled if Θ (y (ι, g) , g) 6= {(ι, g)} is dis-
crete. A discrete pooling set is a set of types where every element is dis-
cretely pooled.
In any signaling equilibrium, each type must belong to one of these three
sets. In the following subsections, we study the properties of separating sets,
continuous pooling sets and discrete pooling sets, respectively.
III. 1 Separati ng set
When a worker belongs to a separating set, Bayes’ rule implies that belief
µ (ι | y, g) must be a singleton measure concentrated at ι. Then, the zero-profits
condition (second condition of Definition 1) is
(4) w (y (ι, g) , g) = f (ι, g − αι) .
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The worker’s truth-telling condition (first condition) is
(5) ι ∈ argmax
{ι˜}
f (˜ι, g − αι˜)− c (ι, g, y (˜ι, g)) .
Notice that each realization of g (ι, η) = x defines a set of possible charac-
teristics
g−1 (x) ≡ {(ι, η) ∈ [ι0, ι1]× [η0, η1] : x = αι+ η}.
As the worker’s production function is a strictly concave, continuous function
of ι, there exists a unique intelligence level such that her productivity is maximal
given the overall ability g. This educational level is defined as
(6) ι∗ (g) = argmax ιbη1−b s.t. g = αι+ η.
It follows from the first-order (necessary and suﬃcient) conditions of the
problem above that ι∗ (g) = bg
α
. Hence, productivity is increasing for ι ≤ ι∗ (g)
and decreasing for ι ≥ ι∗ (g) . The interpretation of this result is straightforward.
Given the result of the interview g, firms prefer moderate intelligence levels since
a worker whose intelligence is too high must have a low level of perseverance.
But, as a worker must be earning her expected productivity in any separat-
ing set, it follows that wages are non-monotone in intelligence (controlling for
the interview g). As shown in the previous signaling literature, when the SCP
is satisfied, the educational level is increasing in the worker’s characteristics.
Suppose this is also the case when the SCP is not valid (i.e., suppose that edu-
cation is increasing in intelligence). Then, firms would oﬀer a higher salary for
individuals with intermediate schooling (as those are the most productive work-
ers).9 But such an allocation cannot be an equilibrium since workers’ strategies
are not optimal: if they reduce the amount of schooling, their wages rise (and,
of course, they obtain a higher utility). Hence, a necessary condition for truth-
telling is that education must be increasing in ι until ι∗ and decreasing after
ι∗.
Notice that this necessary condition for an interior solution follows from the
equalization between the marginal benefit from deviating and its marginal cost.
Since the marginal benefit consists of the wage diﬀerential sι and the marginal
cost consists of the marginal cost of signaling times the signaling diﬀerential
cyyι, we get, by computing sι and cy, that
(7) yι (ι, g) = s (ι) (bg − αι),
which implies that y must be increasing (decreasing) if ι < (>)ι∗ (g) .
From the local second-order condition, we obtain the usual necessary con-
dition that education must be increasing in the CS+ region and decreasing in
CS−. Hence, from the first- and second-order conditions of the problem defined
in equation (5) we obtain the following lemma, whose proof is presented in the
appendix:10
9More precisely, the wage schedule would be increasing in schooling until y (ι∗ (g) , g) and
decreasing from that point on.
10Lemma 1 can be generalized to C1 by parts functions. However, we focus on the C2 by
parts case in order to simplify the proof.
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Lemma 1 In any separating set, if a C2 by parts education and wage profile is
truth-telling it must satisfy
(8) yι (ι, g) (g − 2αι) ≥ 0.
and equation (7).
Corollary 1 In a separating set, the workers with highest schooling are the most
productive ones (not the brightest or the most perseverant ones) and schooling
is strictly increasing in productivity.
Proof. From (7), it follows that
(9) yι (ι, g) > 0⇐⇒ ι <
bg
α
= ι∗ (g) .
Remark 1 Notice that equation (8) implies that
(10) yι (ι, g) ≥ 0⇐⇒ ι ≤
g
2α
.
Generally, equations (9) and (10) cannot hold for all ι except when b = 12 .
In this case, the firms’ technology is identical to the signaling technology. Then,
we can treat ιη as a single parameter and we obtain Spence’s [1973] model.
Moreover, education must be monotone in this (redefined) parameter.
Remark 2 When b 6= 12 , there exists some misalignment between the firm and
the worker since the relative intensity of intelligence of the schooling technology
is diﬀerent from that of the firm’s technology. Then, if min
n
bg
α
; g2α
o
∈ [ι0, ι1] ,
there must exist some pooling in equilibrium (since the separating set conditions
cannot hold for all the interval of parameters).
III. 2 Cont i nuous p o ol i ng set
Let p(ι | g) denote the density function of ι conditional on the result of the
interview g and suppose there exists a non-degenerate closed set I which is a
continuous pooling set and such that no closed setX ⊃ I is a continuous pooling
set. Then, y (ι, g) = y¯ (g) for all ι ∈ I.
The zero-profit condition is
(11) w (y¯ (g) , g) =W (X, g) ,
where W (X, g) ≡
R
X
f (x, g − αx) p(x | g)dx is the expected productivity of a
type-ι worker. Conditions 2 and 3 from Definition 1 are thrivially satisfied in
that given set.
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III. 3 Di s cret e p o ol i ng set
A distinct feature of models where the SCP does not hold is the emergence of
discrete pooling, where individuals with non-adjacent types receive the same
contract [Araujo and Moreira, 2000, 2001]. This feature is a direct consequence
of the possibility of non-monotone signals.
As was shown by Araujo and Moreira [2000], a necessary condition for truth-
telling in a discrete pooling set is the so-called marginal rate of substitution
identity, according to which, if two individuals are (discretely) pooling in a
contract, they should have the same marginal rate of substitution. We formally
state that result as a lemma:
Lemma 2 If two regular workers with the same interview result choose the same
level of education, then their marginal cost of education must be the same:
y (ι, g) = y (˜ι, g)
yι (ι, g) 6= 0
yι (˜ι, g) 6= 0


⇒
∂c (ι, g, y)
∂y
=
∂c (˜ι, g, y)
∂y
.
Remark 3 The economic interpretation of Lemma 2 is that if two non-adjacent
workers with diﬀerent marginal costs of education choose the same contract, one
of them could benefit from deviating by choosing a diﬀerent amount of schooling.
From the equality of the marginal costs of signaling, it follows that if type-
(ι, g) worker is in a discrete pooling set, the other worker pooling with her is
(ˆι, g) defined as:
(12) ιˆ =
g
α
− ι ≡ γ (ι) .
The following lemma will be important for the extension of the model to the
GED exam. It links the productivity of two discretely pooled workers with the
relative intensity of cognitive skills in the firms’ production function.
Lemma 3 If two workers are discretely pooled, then the less intelligent one is
more productive if the firms’ technology is intensive in perseverance (b < 12) and
the more intelligent one is more productive if the firms’ technology is intensive
in intelligence (b > 12).
Let P (x) denote the density of a type-x individual conditional on x belonging
to the pooling-set Θ (y (ι) , g) . Then, if x belongs to a discrete-pooling set, it
follows that
P (x) ≡ p(x | g)
p(ι | g) + p(γ (ι) | g) .
Furthermore, P (ι) + P (γ (ι)) = 1 for all ι in a discrete-pooling set.
Analogously to Lemma 1, the local first- and second-order conditions from
the workers’ truth-telling conditions yield the following:
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Lemma 4 If (ι, g ) belongs to a discrete pooling set, t hen if a C2 by parts edu-
cat i on and w age p ro file is t uth-tel l ing, they satisfy:
yι (ι, g ) = f (ι, η ) [P (ι) (bg − αι) + P 0 (ι)](13)
+ α1−2bf (η, ι) {(1− P (ι)) [(1− b) g − αι] + P 0 (ι)} ,
(14) yι (ι, g ) (g − 2αι ) ≥ 0.
Equation (13) displays how discrete p o oling distorts an incentive-compatible
profile of education. As in the s eparated case, e quation (13) equates the marginal
cost with the marginal b ene fit of e ducation. However, d ue to the f act that i n
the discrete p o oling case wages are a weighted ave rage of pro ductivities, the
marginal b enefit of e ducation in a d iscrete p o oling set is a we ight ed average of
marginal productivities.11
In the next subsection, we present some comparative statics results as well
as the equilibrium selection criterion.
III. 4 Equilibri um selection and comparative statics
The proposition below presents some comparative statics results. Since educa-
tion is costly, individuals would only choose to educate if this increases their
wages. Thus, incentive-compatibility requires wages to be strictly monotonic.
Proposition 1 Wages are strictly increasing and concave in the amount of
schooling controlling for the interview.
Notice that productivity is increasing in the result of the interview g. Then,
in a separating set, wages must be increasing in g. However, this may not be
true in a pooling set: since wages are a weighed average of the productivity of
pooled types (where weights are given by the conditional probability of each
type), a change in g would also aﬀect the weights attributed to each type. In a
discrete pooling set, for example, it follows that12
∂w
∂g
= P (ι) fη (ι, η) + [1− P (ι)] fη (ˆι, ηˆ) +
∂P (ι)
∂g
[s (ι)− s (ˆι)] .
The first and second terms are positive and represent the direct eﬀect: more
productive individuals get a higher result in the interview. The last term may
be eigher positive or negative and reflects the indirect eﬀect. If the amount of
more productive individuals is decreasing in g, then this term is negative.13 If
ι | g is uniformly distributed, for example, then this last term vanishes (since
the conditional distribution of ι is constant) implying that wages are increasing
in the interview.
11Notice that the separating set is a special case of the discrete pooling set where firms are
able to infer the workers ability in a pooling set (P (ι) = 1).
12The same argument also holds for continuous pooling sets.
13Let s (ι) > s (ˆι) . Then, ∂w∂g < 0 if and only if
∂P (ι)
∂g < −
P (ι)fη(ι,η)+[1−P (ι)]fη (ˆι,ηˆ)
s(ι)−s(ˆι) .
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The diﬀerence between the monotonicity of wages in education (Proposition
1) and the non-monotonicity of wages in the interview stems from the fact that
education is an endogenous signal while the interview is an exogenous signal.
When a costly signal is endogenous, an agent will not purchase an additional
amount of it unless he obtains higher wages by doing so. In contrast, when
a signal is exogenous, the agent is unable to distort it. Hence, wages may be
non-monotonic in this signal.
As the concept of PBE leads to an indeterminacy of equilibria, it is important
to apply a selection criterion in order to pick an equilibrium. Riley [1979]
suggested the concept of a reactive equilibrium that chooses only the separating
equilibrium in the continuous-type framework. This concept has been widely
applied in the signaling literature.
As a fully separating equilibrium does not exist when the single-crossing
property does not hold, one must employ a weaker refinement criterion. Araujo
and Moreira [2001] proposed the quasi-separability criterion which consists of
a slight modification to the concept of reactive equilibrium (both concepts are
equivalent when the SCP holds).
Like the reactive equilibrium, the quasi-separable equilibrium seeks a unique
equilibrium with the highest degree of separation and which Pareto dominates
other signaling equilibria. The following definition introduces the quasi-separability
criterion.
Definition 4 A PBE is quasi-separable if:
1. A worker belongs to a pooling set, then there exists a worker with a diﬀerent
type that pools with him such that their marginal cost of schooling must be
the same;
2. There is no other PBE satisfying condition 1 such that every type obtains
less schooling (with strictly less to at least one type).
The first condition identifies the highest possible degree of separability. The
second condition gives the boundary condition which uniquely determines the
equilibrium. It consists on a Pareto improvement criterion for selection.
The following proposition can be seen as an evidence that the SCP does not
hold. It states that two individuals with diﬀerent abilities obtaining the same
amount of schooling is not consistent with the SCP. Hence, the fact that the
empirical evidence documents that workers with diﬀerent abilities receive the
same wages suggests that the SCP is violated.
Proposition 2 If the pooling set of a quasi-separable equilibrium is non-empty,
then the SCP does not hold.
III. 5 Charac t eri z at i on of t he equi l i bri um
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium of the model. As the results
are more technical than the rest of the paper and are not crucial to any of our
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results, it can be skipped by readers more interested in the applications of the
model.
As in equation 12, we denote by γ (ι) the type with the same marginal cost of
signaling as ι.We will focus on the case where γ (ι0) ≤ ι1 and b < 1/2 (the other
cases can be studied in a similar fashion).14 Clearly, as γ (ι0) ≤ ι1, it follows
that (γ (ι0) , ι1] must be a separating set in any quasi-separable equilibrium (as
no other type can have the same marginal cost of schooling as ι ∈ (γ (ι0) , ι1]).
The characterization will be done through a series of lemmata.
Define the indirect utility U (ˆι, ι) as the utility received by a type-ι worker
who gets the contract designed for type ιˆ:
U (ˆι, ι) ≡ s (ˆι)− c (ι, g, y (ˆι, g)) .
The first lemma establishes another necessary condition for truth-telling.15
Lemma 5 U (ˆι, ι) is continuous at ιˆ = ι for all ι ∈ [ι0, ι1] .
The basic intuition behind this result is that, as the cost of signaling is con-
tinuous, if the indirect utility were discontinuous those individuals in a vicinity
of the point of discontinuity could benefit from another type’s contract. Hence,
it would not be truth-telling.
The continuity of U enables us to determine the boundary condition for the
amount of education when changing from discrete pooling sets to separating
sets. Notice that when a worker becomes pooled with another type, his ex-
pected productivity changes discontinually (as it becomes the average of their
productivities). Thus, his wage becomes discontinuous. Hence, the education
must be discontinuous in order to preserve the continuity of the indirect utility.
This is formally established in the following corollary:
Corollary 2 (i) Let ι be such that [ι, ι+ ε] is a discrete pooling set and [ι− ε, ι)
is a separating set, for some ε > 0. The following condition is necessary for
truth-telling:
(15) y (ι) = − ι (g − αι) [s (ι)− s (γ(ι))]
2
+ lim
x→ι−
y (x) .
(ii) Let ι be such that [ι− ε, ι] is a discrete pooling set and (ι, ι+ ε] is a
separating set, for some ε > 0. The following condition is necessary for truth-
telling:
(16) y (ι) = − ι (g − αι) [s (ι)− s (γ(ι))]
2
+ lim
x→ι+
y (x) .
The second lemma determines the maximal discrete pooling set.
14See Araujo, Gottlieb, and Moreira [2004a] for a characterization of the equilibrium in
more general models.
15Lemma 5 could also be seen as an implication of the Theorem of the Maximum by estab-
lishing the continuity of wages in education.
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Lemma 6 [ι0, γ (ι0)] is a discrete pooling set.
As the set (γ (ι0) , ι1]must be separated, it follows from Lemma 6 that the set
of types can be partitioned in two intervals: a discrete pooling interval [ι0, γ (ι0)]
and a separated interval (γ (ι0) , ι1].
The next lemma determines the boundary condition which gives the equi-
librium amount of education. It ensures that the individual with the lowest
productivity chooses to get no education.
Lemma 7 In any quasi-separable equilibrium, y (ι1) = 0.
The proof basically shows that as ι1 is separated and is the least productive
type, reducing the amount of schooling would never reduce its wages (as no firm
would ever expect some type to be less productive than ι1). But this would also
reduce the cost of schooling. Thus, in equilibrium, ι1 must choose the lowest
amount of schooling possible.
The following lemma establishes suﬃcient conditions for an equilibrium. It
was demonstrated by Araujo and Moreira [2000].
Lemma 8 The diﬀerential equations from Lemmas 1, 4 and the boundary con-
ditions from Lemmas 5 and 7 are suﬃcient for the quasi-separable equilibrium.
The next proposition is a direct consequence of Lemmas 1, 4, 7, and 8, and
Corollary 2.
Proposition 3 A C2 by parts education profile is a quasi-separable equilibrium
if, and only if it satisfies:
1. yι (ι, g) = s (ι) (bg − αι), for ι > γ (ι0) ;
2. y(ι1, g) = 0;
3. yι (ι, g) = f (ι, η) [(bg − αι)P (ι) + P 0(ι)]+
α1−2bf (η, ι) {P (γ (ι)) [(1− b) g − αι]− P 0(γ (ι))} , for ι ≤ γ (ι0) ;
4. y (γ (ι0) , g) =
ι0(g−αι0)[s(ι0)−s(γ(ι0))]
2 + limx→γ(ι0)+ y (x) .
Proposition 3 is useful as it reduces the problem of obtaining an equilib-
rium profile of education to that of solving two ordinary diﬀerential equations
with given boundary conditions. As both diﬀerential equations are Lipschitz, it
follows that the quasi-separable equilibrium exists and is unique.
The amount of education for separated types is determined from the first
equation of Proposition 3 and the boundary condition is given by y(ι1) = 0.
Then, using conditions 3 and 4 from Proposition 3 (a diﬀerential equation with
a boundary condition), one can calculate the equilibrium amount of education
for discrete pooling types.
Notice that item 4 from Proposition 3 implies that education must jump
downward at γ (ι0) since s (ι0) − s (γ (ι0)) > 0 (see Lemma 3 and b < 1/2).
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This follows from the fact that wages are discontinuous: individuals with ι ∈£
g
2α , γ (ι0)
¤
earn wages higher than their productivity since they are pooled with
more productive workers but those with types higher than γ (ι0) earn their pro-
ductivity since they are separated. Hence, if education were continuous, indirect
utility would be discontinuous. But, as shown in Lemma 5, a discontinuous in-
direct utility is not incentive-compatible. Thus, the amount of education must
jump downward in order to preserve the continuity of the indirect utility func-
tion.
The following graphs present the equilibrium amount of education, wages
and utility for the case where b = 0.4, g = 10, α = 1, ι0 = 1, ι1 = 10, and
ι | g ∼ U [ι0, ι1] .16
Figure 2
16Araujo, Gottlieb, and Moreira [2004b] present the equilibrium profiles of education, wages,
and utility for other parameters.
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Figure 3
Figure 4
Notice that both education and wages are discontinuous but the utility is
countinous in ι. In the graph below, the profile of wages as a function of edu-
cation is presented. As Proposition 1 shows, wages are strictly increasing and
concave in education.
15
Figure 5
 Countersignaling
In some situations, high-productivity individuals may choose to signal less than
those with lower productivity. Clements [2004] argues that many high-quality
products are sold in low-quality packages. Moreover, Caves and Greene [1996]
found no significant systematic positive correlation between quality and adver-
tising.
O’Neil [2002] argues that the fact that most advanced countries had lower
military spendings than those intermediately advanced after World War II oc-
curred due to countersignaling.
Hvide [2003] argues that individuals with intermediate abilities educate more
than bright individuals in professions where a license is not required to work.
Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To [2001] present a countersignaling model applied
to the labor market. As in our basic framework, firms access some measure of the
worker’s ability (which is interpreted as the recommendation of a former boss).
This signal consists of the sum of the unidimensional ability of the worker and
a noise term. Workers may also engage in schooling activity. In equilibrium,
low-ability workers and high-ability workers choose not to participate in the
signaling game. This occurs since a productive worker has very high probability
of receiving a good recommendation and a low-productivity worker has very
low probability of receiving good recommendation. Thus, in both cases, the
expected benefits from signaling are not suﬃciently high. For individuals who
choose to participate in the signaling game, the equilibrium is equivalent to the
traditional signaling models.
Unlike the model of Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To, the uncertainty about
productivity comes from the fact that the schooling technology diﬀers from the
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firms’ technology in our model. This misalignment between these two tech-
nologies generates an incentive for some higher-productivity workers to educate
less. Thus, while in their model the presence of another signal implies that some
types may choose not to participate, countersignaling in this model emerges due
to incentive reasons.
Orzach, Baltzer Overgaard, and Tauman [2002] present a model where firms
signal product quality through prices and advertising expenditures. Product
quality is represented by a parameter that may take two values. Their main
conclusion is that modest advertising can be used as a signal of high quality.
However, as their model features only two types of firms, they are unable to
consider the emergence of non-monotone signals.
In this section, we show how the basic model presented allows us to under-
stand the existence of countersignaling.
First, we present a precise definition of countersignaling.
Definition 5 A type-(ι, g) worker is countersignaling if
sgn{yι (ι, g)} 6= sgn{sι (ι)}.
The definition above states that countersignaling occurs if more productive
individuals choose less education than intermediate individuals. With no loss of
generality, we can restrict to the case where b ≤ 12 (since we can always relabel
ι and η).
As shown in Section III.5, education i s strictly increasing f or ι <g2α a d
strictly decreasing for ι > g2α . Moreover, as argued in page 7, the productivity
of a worker with interview result g is strictly increasing for ι < bg
α
and strictly
decreasing for ι > bg
α
. Then, the countersignaling interval is [ bg
α
, g2α ]. Hence,
countersignaling occurs if, and only if, the schooling technology is not the same
as the firms’ technology b 6= 12 .
Define the distance between the Cobb-Douglas functions f (ι, η) = ιbη1−b
and f˜ (ι, η) = ιb˜η1−b˜ as
¯¯¯
b− b˜
¯¯¯
. Then, the distance from the schooling tech-
nology to the firms’ technology is given by 12 − b. Notice that increasing the
distance between the two technologies (i.e., reducing b) strictly increases the
countersignaling interval. Thus, we have proved the following:
Proposition 4 Countersignaling occurs if and only if the schooling and the
firms’ technologies are not the same (i.e., the SCP does not hold), and the
countersignaling interval is strictly increasing in the distance from the schooling
technology to the firms’ technology.
This proposition provides an intuitive testable implication. Countersignaling
is expected to occur more often in occupations that require a diﬀerent combi-
nation of skills than those required at school. Hence, productive individuals
with low educations should be more common among sportsmen or artists than
among teachers.
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 The GED exam
V. 1 Empirical evidence
The General Educational Development (GED) is an exam taken by American
high school dropouts to certify their equivalence with high school graduates. It
started in 1942 as a way to allow veterans without a high school diploma to
obtain a secondary school credential. Nowadays, about half of the students who
have dropped out of high school and a fifth of those classified as high school
graduates by the U.S. Census are GED recipients.
The GED consists of five tests covering mathematics, writing, social studies,
science, and literature and arts. Except for the writing part, all other sections
are made of multiple choice questions. The costs of acquiring a GED are rel-
atively small. The pecuniary costs range from zero dollars in some states to
around fifty in other states and the median study time for the tests is only
about twenty hours.
Even though the U.S. Census classifies dropouts who have acquired a GED
as ordinary high school graduates, the market does not treat them equally. GED
recipients earn lower wages, work less in any year and stay at jobs for shorter
periods than high school graduates [Boesel, Alsalam and Smith, 1998].
GED recipients are smarter than other dropouts but exhibit more behavior
and self discipline problems and are less able to finish tasks. They turn over
jobs at a faster rate and are more likely to fight at school and work, use pot,
skip school and participate in robberies. Hence, the GED conveys two pieces of
information in one signal. The student who acquires it is bright, but lacks per-
severance and self discipline [Cameron and Heckman, 1993, Cavallo, Heckman
and Hsee, 1998, and Heckman and Rubistein, 2000].
Cavallo, Heckman and Hsee [1998] and Heckman and Rubinstein [2001] have
shown that when one controls for both cognitive and non-cognitive abilities,
there is no diﬀerence in earnings between a GED recipient and a dropout who
has not taken the exam. As for females, the evidence is the same as that of
males, except for those who dropped out because of pregnancy [Carneiro and
Heckman, 2003].17
As dropouts who have taken the GED are treated in the labor market just
like those who have not taken it, any theory that tries to explain this exam
must exhibit pooling in equilibrium. Moreover, since GED recipients do not
earn higher wages, the signal-earnings relation is not strictly monotone as in
the traditional signaling models.
Despite of being the usual assumption in signalling models [e.g. Spence,
1973, 1974] and early human capital models [e.g. Becker, 1964], it is widely
accepted that an individual’s personal abilities cannot be successfully captured
by a scalar of cognitive skills. Cawley, Conneely, Heckman, and Vytlacil [1996],
for example, showed that cognitive ability is only a minor predictor of social
17Tyler, Murnane, and Willett [2000] suggested than the GED does not increase wages
except for young white dropouts who are in the margin of passing the exam.
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performance and that many non-cognitive factors are important determinants
of blue collar wages.
Bowles and Gintis [2001] provided an interesting example of the importance
of non-cognitive skills for labor market success. From a survey of 3,000 employers
[Bureau of the Census, 1998], they were asked “When you consider hiring a new
nonsupervisory or production worker, how important are the following in your
decision to hire?”. On a scale of 1 to 5, employers ranked “years of schooling”
at 2.9, and “scores on tests given by employer” and “academic performance”
at 2.5. The non-cognitive skills, “attitude” and “communication skills”, were
ranked at 4.6 and 4.2, respectively.
Weiss [1988] and Klein, Spady and Weiss [1991] showed that lower quit rates
and lower absenteeism account for most of the premium awarded by high school
graduates compared to high school dropouts (and not higher productivity).
Bowles and Gintis [1976] suggest that employers in low skill markets value
docility, dependability and persistence more than cognitive skills. Bowles and
Gintis [1998] argue that personality and other aﬀective traits reduce the costs
of labor turnover and contract enforcement.
In the Psychology field, the widely accepted five-factor model of personal-
ity (referred to as the “Big Five”) identifies five dimensions of non-cognitive
characteristics: extroversion, conscientiousness, emotional stability, agreeable-
ness, and openness to experience. Personality measures based on this model are
good predictors of job performance for a wide range of professions [Barrick and
Mount, 1991].
Hogan and Hogan [1989], Barrick and Mount [1991], and Boudreau, Boswell,
and Judge [2001] show that personality traits are important predictors of suc-
cessful employment. Goﬃn, Rothstein and Johnston [1996] demonstrate that
personality characteristics predict job performance better than cognitive skills.
Dunafon and Duncan [1998, 1999] document that a series of behavioral char-
acteristics measured when young significantly aﬀect earnings 25 years latter.
Edwards [1976] shows that dependability and consistency are more valued by
blue collar supervisors than cognitive ability.18
V. 2 The Mo del
In this subsection, we extend the basic framework to study the eﬀect of the
introduction of a pass-or-fail test like the GED. We model the GED as a signal
h (ι, η) which only individuals with a suﬃciently high combination of charac-
teristics are able to receive. More specifically, denoting by h (ι, η) = 1 if an
individual passes the exam and h (ι, η) = 0 if she fails, we specify the test as
h =
½
1, if κι+ η ≥ g
0, if otherwise
,
18There is also significant literature on the importance of non-cognitive skills in business
organizations [e.g. Sternberg, 1985, and Gardner, 1993], and military organizations [e.g.
Laurence, 1998].
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where g ∈ R++ is the parameter that represents the minimum combination of
skills required to pass the test (passing standards) and κ is the rate of substitu-
tion between intelligence and perseverance.19 We assume that there is no cost
in taking the test.20
An employer cannot distinguish a worker who failed the GED exam from a
worker who did not take it. Hence, a worker who is able to pass the test will
take it as long as her utility is not decreased by holding the certificate.
Controlling for the interview result g, h can be rewritten as
h =
½
1, if (κ− α)ι ≥ g − g
0, otherwise.
.
According to Heckman, Hsee and Rubinstein [1998], the GED exam i s i n-
tensive in cognitive skills. Hence, we shall assume that the exam h emphasizes
intelligence more than the interview g does:
Assumption 1 κ > α.
Then, each worker with ι ≥ g−g
κ−α would be able to pass the test. The graphs
below separate the interval [ι0, ι1] in three regions. The first graph depicts the
case where g−g
κ−α >
g
2α , while the second represents the case where
g−g
κ−α <
g
2α .
Figure 6
In the left region, workers have low intelligence. Hence, education must be
increasing in intelligence (CS+ region) and the worker is unable to pass the
test. In the right side, workers have high intelligence. Thus, education must be
decreasing in intelligence (CS− region) and the worker is able to pass the test.
The region in the middle depends on the sign of g−g
κ−α −
g
2α . If
g−g
κ−α >
g
2α
(first graph), some workers with types in the CS− region are unable to receive
19The assumption that schooling does not aﬀect the possibility of passing the GED is
unimportant for our results. As would probably be clear, all results still hold if education
entered linearly in the minimum combination of skills.
20As the median time studying for the GED exam is 20 hours and the monetary costs range
from zero to fifty dollars it seems that the actual costs of taking a GED are very low.
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h = 1. If g−g
κ−α <
g
2α (second graph), some workers with types in the CS+ region
are able to pass the test.
The following proposition is the main result of this section. It states that, as
long as the firms’ technology is intensive in non-cognitive skills, the introduction
of the test does not aﬀect earnings. Thus, we say that in this case the GED is
a neutral signal.
Proposition 5 If the firms’ technology is intensive in non-cognitive skills, the
introduction of the GED exam does not modify the wage schedule and the profile
of education.
Proof. The result is trivial for a separating set. Assume two workers with
ι ≤ g−g
κ−α ≤ ιˆ are pooled in the same contract (otherwise, the signal is not
informational). Then type-ˆι has h = 1 (if he chooses to take the exam) and
type-ι has h = 0. Then, from Lemma 3, the firm would oﬀer a higher salary for
the type-ι worker. But this cannot be an equilibrium since the type-ˆι worker’s
strategy is not optimal (condition 1).
Thus, any wage schedule such that a type-ˆι individual earns less than type
ι cannot be an equilibrium. Hence, a type-ˆι individual must earn the same as
type ι and is indiﬀerent between taking the GED or not.
Remark 4 Even though the GED does not aﬀect wages, it reveals information
about the workers’ characteristics. Hence, consistent with Heckman and Ru-
binstein [2001] and Cavallo, Heckman and Hsee [1998], firms oﬀer the same
wages to individuals with low cognitive skills/high non-cognitive skills as to high
cognitive skills/low non-cognitive skills individuals.
Remark 5 As the result above holds for all g ∈ R++, it follows that, unlike
Cavallo, Heckman and Hsee [1998] suggested, an increase in the GED standards
g¯ would not aﬀect the wages schedule. This implication of the model could be
tested as passing standards vary by states and have changed over time. Thus,
one could test if the neutrality of the GED is robust to diﬀerent states and
diﬀerent periods of time.
Remark 6 Since the introduction of the GED does not aﬀect the equilibrium
amount of education, our model does not support the claim that, when the GED
is neutral, it may discourage education [e.g. Cavallo, Heckman and Hsee, 1998].
Notice that a key assumption for the neutrality of the GED is that the firms’
technology is intensive in non-cognitive abilities.21 The next proposition states
that when the firms’ technology is intensive in cognitive skills, the GED signal
may be non-neutral in equilibrium.
21Another assumption which is central to our results is that the GED is not costly. Nev-
ertheless, our results still hold when the GED is costly as long as there exists some external
benefits from being a high school graduate. The neutrality of the GED does not depend on
the assumption that schooling does not aﬀect the ability to pass on the exam. For example,
suppose that an individual would be able to pass on the GED if κι+ η + βy ≥ g. Then, the
shaded area in Figure 5 would depend on y but if two workers were discretely pooled in a
contract, the one who could pass the test would still be the least productive worker.
21
Proposition 6 If the firms’ technology is intensive in cognitive skills and there
are two types pooled in the same contract such that ι ≤ g−g
κ−α ≤ ιˆ, then the signal
is non-neutral: the wage received by a type-ˆι worker will be strictly higher than
that of a type-ι worker.
Proof. In this case, the worker with the highest productivity will be ιˆ.
Hence, signaling h = 1 will diﬀerentiate him from ι and allows the firm to oﬀer
a higher salary.
Corollary 3 A signal h that places more weight to non-cognitive skills (κ < α)
is non-neutral.
Remark 7 A way to make the GED exam a non-neutral signal would be to put
more emphasis on non-cognitive skills as it would separate two pooled workers
with diﬀerent signs h. Even though it must be significantly harder to design
a signal that emphasizes non-cognitive skills, psychologists have developed tests
that measure such skills which have been used by companies to screen workers
[e.g. Sternberg, 1985].
Remark 8 When the GED is non-neutral (b > 12), it separates two previously
pooled workers. Then, the wage received by the more (less) productive worker
increases (decreases). As incentive-compatibility requires that the indirect utility
must be continuous, it follows that, in this case, the introduction of the GED in-
creases (decreases) the education obtained by the more (less) productive workers.
Hence, another testable implication of the model is that the variance of educa-
tion should increase when the GED is non-neutral and should remain constant
when it is neutral.
As shown in Propositions 5 and 6, the introduction of an additional signal
implements a fully separating equilibrium. It is possible to generalize this result
further and show that, in a model where the sign of cyι changes n times, it is
suﬃcient to introduce n additional binary signals to implement full separability:
Proposition 7 Let n be the (finite) number of times that cθy (θ, y) changes sign.
n additional binary signals are suﬃcient to implement a separable equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
When the SCP holds, Engers and Fernandez [1987] have shown that one
signal is suﬃcient for full separation. Thus, their result is a special case of
Proposition 7 when cyι does not change signs. This result can be applied to
study the optimal design of tests.
 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a multidimensional signaling model of mixed signals.
It was shown that when firms have access to an interview technology, the single-
crossing property may not hold. When this is the case, signals are mixed in the
sense that they convey two pieces of information.
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Two applications of the model were presented. In the first, we analyzed the
emergence of countersignaling, where signals are non-monotone in the worker’s
productivity. It was shown that countersignaling occurs if, and only if, the
schooling technology diﬀers from the firm’s technology. Moreover, the coun-
tersignaling interval is strictly increasing in the distance between the schooling
and the firm’s technologies. Hence, this phenomenon is expected to be more
important in occupations that require more diﬀerent combination of skills from
those required in the schooling process.
In the second application, we introduced the GED exam. It was shown that,
consistently with the empirical evidence, a GED recipient has above average
cognitive skills and below average non-cognitive skills. When cognitive skills are
more valued in the labor market, this new information aﬀects the equilibrium
wage. However, when non-cognitive skills are more valued in the labor market
than cognitive skills (as suggested by significant empirical evidence), it does not
aﬀect the wage schedule.
The main problem with the GED is its focus on cognitive skills. As the firms’
main concern is usually on the worker’s non-cognitive skills, a non-neutral signal
should assign more weight to these kind of skills. Thus, changing its focus to
non-cognitive skills would turn it into a non-neutral signal. Moreover, increasing
the passing standards with no change of the relative intensity of each skill in
the test would not change the equilibrium wages.
Another contribution of this article is to provide an evidence of the impor-
tance of the failure of the single-crossing condition in providing intuitive expla-
nations to observed phenomena. As the absence of this property is necessary for
the existence of discrete pooling in equilibrium, the fact that an individual with
high cognitive ability and low non-cognitive ability receives the same wages as
another with low cognitive ability and high non-cognitive ability while an indi-
vidual with intermediate abilities does not is an evidence of no single-crossing
property.
This paper also has a technical interest as it presents a signaling model where
the single-crossing condition does not hold. This framework can be employed
in a wide variety of multidimensional signaling models and, in particular, other
mixed signals. Drazen and Hubrich [2003] presented evidence that interest rates
are mixed signals as they show that the government is committed to maintaining
the exchange rate, but may also signal weak fundaments. Burtless [1985] pro-
vided another example of a mixed signal where a program provided subsidies for
hiring severely disadvantaged workers. However, as the program was excessively
targeted, the beneficiaries were widely perceived as incapable. Hence, despite
of the subsidies, few employers hired the targeted population.
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Appendix
A Robustness of the Single-Crossing property
In this section, we characterize the set of functions h and g that satisfy for the
single-crossing property (SCP). We shall argue that the results of the model are
robust as long as the firms’ technology and the schooling technology cannot be
ordered according to their technical rates of substitution.
Let the cost of signaling be represented by the twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable function
c =
y
w (ι, η)
,
which is assumed to be strictly decreasing in ι and η and strictly increasing in
y.
The interview technology is represented by the twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable function g (ι, η) which is assumed to be strictly increasing.
From the implicit function theorem, there exists ϕ (ι, g¯) such that
ϕ (ι, g¯) = η.
Moreover,
ϕι = −
gι
gη
.
Substituting in the cost function, it follows that
c =
y
w(ι, ϕ (ι, g¯))
.
Hence,
cyι = −
wι − wη × gιgη
[w(ι, ϕ (ι, g¯))]2
.
Thus, the SCP holds if, and only if, wι
wη
− gι
gη
has a constant sign for all
ι, η. Therefore, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the SCP to hold is that
the technical rates of substitution of the schooling technology and the firms’
technology can be ordered.
Suppose, for example, that w and g are both CES functions:22
w = [α1ι
ρ + α2η
ρ]
1
ρ ,
g = [β1ι
γ + β2η
γ ]
1
γ .
Then, the SCP holds if, and only if, η
ι
−
³
β1
α1
α2
β2
´ 1
γ−ρ
has a constant sign for
all ι, η.
22The functions considered in the model are special cases of the CES when γ = 0, β1 = α,
β2 = 1, ρ→ 0, and α1 = α2 = 1.
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B Number of tests required for full-separability
As shown in S ection V, the intro duction of the GED implemented f ull-separability.
In this section, we generalize this result for the case where cθy changes sign a
finite numb er of times. As sp ecial c ases, we obtain the result of Section V as we ll
as Engers and Fernandez’s [1987] result that when the single-crossing property
holds no additional signal is required.
The following assumption generalize the single-crossing property as well as
the double-crossing property of the model presented before.
Assumption A.1 The sign of cθy (θ, y) does not depend on y, and the number
times that cθy (θ, y) changes sign is finite.
We denote by n be the number of times that cθy (θ, y) changes sign.
The following assumption is important for the existence of equilibrium.
Assumption A.2 p, f ∈ C1.
The following proposition states that under Assumptions A.1 and A.2 there
always exists a quasi-separable equilibrium.
Proposition 8 There exists a quasi-separable equilibrium.
Proof. See Araujo, Gottlieb, and Moreira [2004a].
We are now able to prove Proposition 7, which states that n additional
signals are suﬃcient to implement a separable equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 7. From the first condition of Definition 4, for any
y ∈ R+, there are at most n+ 1 pooled types. Let k ≤ n+ 1 be the number of
pooled types. With no loss of generality, reorder them as θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ ... ≤ θk.
Introduce a costless binary signal h1 such that type-θ1 is the only worker
who is able to obtain h1 = 1 (if more than one type have the same productivity,
take any of them). Thus, only the least productive worker is able to pass the
h1 exam. Then, a profile of education and wages such that the utility obtained
by type-θ1 when he takes the test is lower than if he does not take it is not
incentive-compatible. Hence, the utility obtained after taking the test must be
the same as if the test were not available. Furthermore, if the education obtained
by θ1 changed, the marginal rate of substitution identity would no longer hold.
Thus, it follows that the introduction of the signal h1 does not change the
equilibrium profiles of education and wages but separates type θ1 from the
θ2, ..., θk (i.e., the new equilibrium will feature k − 1 pooled). Repeating the
process t times, there will be at most k− t pooled types. Therefore, introducing
k − 1 new signals, it follows that there will be at most 1 type pooling in each
contract.
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C Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1:
Define U (ˆι, ι) as the utility received by a type-(ι, g) individual who gets a
contract designed for a type (ˆι, g) individual:
U (ˆι, ι) ≡ s (˜ι)− c (ι, g, y (˜ι, g)) .
In order to be true-telling, each worker must prefer to announce his own
type:
U (ι, ι) ≥ U (ˆι, ι) , ∀ιˆ, ι ∈ [ι0, ι1] .
The following local first- and second-order conditions must be satisfied:
∂U (ˆι, ι)
∂ιˆ
¯¯¯¯
ιˆ=ι
= 0,(17)
∂U2 (ˆι, ι)
∂ιˆ2
¯¯¯¯
ιˆ=ι
≤ 0.
The first-order condition yields, for all ι,
(18) sι (ι)− cy (ι, g, y (ι, g)) yι (ι, g) = 0 ∴ yι (ι, g) = s (ι) (bg − αι).
Taking the total derivative of the condition above with respect to ι, we get
(19) cyι (ι, g, y (ι, g)) yι (ι, g) = sιι (ι)− cyy (ι, g, y (ι, g)) yι (ι, g)
−cy (ι, g, y (ι, g)) yιι (ι, g) .
The second-order condition yields
(20) sιι (ι)− cyy (ι, g, y (ι, g)) yι (ι, g)− cy (ι, g, y (ι, g)) yιι (ι, g) ≤ 0.
Substituting (19) in (20), it follows that
cyι (ι, g, y (ι, g)) yι (ι, g) ≤ 0 ∴ g − 2αι
(ιη)2
yι (ι, g) ≥ 0.
Thus, yι (ι, g) (g − 2αι) ≥ 0. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2:
Let {w (y (ι, g)) , y (ι, g)} be an incentive-compatible profile of education and
wages:
ι ∈ argmax
ι˜
w (y (˜ι, g) , g)− c (ι, g, y (˜ι, g)) ,
The first-order condition of the problem above yields
(21) wy (y (ι, g) , g) = cy (ι, g, y (ι, g)) .
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Suppose that y (ι, g) = y (˜ι, g) for some regular types ι, ι˜. Then, it follows
that
wy (y (ι, g) , g) = wy (y (˜ι, g) , g) .
Substituting in equation (21) yields cy (ι, g, y (ι, g)) = cy (˜ι, g, y (˜ι, g)) . ¥
Proof of Lemma 3:
Let ι > ιˆ be two discretely pooled workers and notice that αιˆ = η and
αι = ηˆ. Substituting in the firm’s technology yields,
f (ι, g) > f (ˆι, g)⇐⇒ ιbιˆ1−b > ιˆbι1−b ⇐⇒ 2b > 1.
¥
Proof of Lemma 4:
From equation (3), the productivity of a type-ˆι worker can be written as
s (ˆι) = α1−2b (g − αι)b ι1−b
= α1−2bf (η, ι) .
The zero-profit condition is
w (y (ι, g) , g) = P (ι) f (ι, η) + P (γ (ι))α1−2bf (η, ι) ,
where P (x) ≡ p(x|g)
p(ι|g)+p(γ(ι)|g) .
As in the proof of Lemma 1, define U (ˆι, ι) as
U (ˆι, ι) = P (ˆι) f (ˆι, ηˆ) + P (γ (ˆι))α1−2bf (ηˆ, ιˆ)− c (ι, y (ˆι, g)) ,
where ηˆ = g − αιˆ.
The truth-telling condition is
ι ∈ argmax
ιˆ
U (ˆι, ι) , ∀ιˆ, ι ∈ [ι0, ι1] .
The local first-order condition yields, for all ι,
(22) U1 (ι, ι) = 0.
Substituting U in the equation above, we get
yι (ι, g) = f (ι, η) [(bg − αι)P (ι) + P 0(ι)]
+ α1−2bf (η, ι) {P (γ (ι)) [(1− b) g − αι]− P 0(γ (ι))} .
Diﬀerentiating equation (22) yields
(23) U11 (ι, ι) + U12 (ι, ι) = 0
The second-order condition is
(24) U11 (ι, ι) ≤ 0
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Substituting (23) in (24), it follows that
U12 (ι, ι) ≥ 0 ∴ (g − 2αι) yι (ι, g) ≥ 0.
¥
Proof of Proposition 1:
Suppose that wages are not strictly increasing in education.23 Then, there
exist types ι and ι˜ such that
y (ι, g) > y (˜ι, g) and w (y (ι, g) , g) ≤ w (y (˜ι, g) , g) .
But this is not truth-telling since
w (y (ι, g) , g)− y (ι, g)
ιη
< w (y (˜ι, g) , g)− y (˜ι, g)
ιη
,
concluding the first part of the proof.
In order to establish the concavity of w, consider the indirect mechanism
where individuals reveal y instead of θ. Then, the truthfulness condition is
y (θ) ∈ argmax
y
w (y)− y
ι (g − αι) .
The second-order condition (necessary) is24
w00 (y (θ)) ≤ 0.
¥
Proof of Proposition 2:
Suppose that type ι belongs to a pooling set. Then, there exists a type
ιˆ = g
α
− ι 6= ι that pools in a contract with ι. Hence, ι+ ιˆ = g2α , implying that
ι and ιˆ cannot both belong to CS+ or CS−. ¥
Proof of Lemma 5:
(i) Suppose that ι is an interior point of either a separating set or a discrete
pooling set. Then, as y is continuous (since it solves a diﬀerential equation) it
follows that:
lim
x→ι−
U (ι, x) = lim
x→ι+
U (ι, x) = U (ι, ι) .
23This proposition can also be proved using the Chain Rule: since ∂w∂ι =
wy (y (ι, g) , g) yι (ι, g) , and
sgn{wy} = sgn{yι},
the result follows.
24Another way of demonstrating the monotonicity of w consists of calculating the first-order
condition of the indirect mechanism, which yields: w0 (y (θ)) = 1ι(g−αι) > 0.
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Suppose that [ι, ι+ ε] is a discrete pooling set and [ι − ε, ι) is a separating
set, for some ε > 0. Clearly, a necessary condition for truth-telling is
lim
x→ι−
U (x, x) ≥ lim
x→ι−
U (ι, x) ,
which means that the last individuals in the separating set would not want to
get the contract of the first individual in the discrete pooling set. Then,
lim
x→ι−
U (x, x) = s (ι)−
limx→ι− y (x)
ι (g − αι) ,
lim
x→ι−
U (ι, x) =
s (ι) + s (γι)
2
− y (ι)
ι (g − αι) .
Thus, the inequality can be written as
y (ι) ≥ lim
x→ι−
y (x)− ι (g − αι) [s (ι)− s (γι)]
2
.
Another necessary condition for truth-telling is
U (ι, ι) ≥ lim
x→ι−
U (x, ι) ,
which states that the first individual in the discrete pooling set would not want
to get the contract of the last individuals in the separating set.
Expanding the indirect utility functions, it follows that
U (ι, ι) =
s (ι) + s (γι)
2
− y (ι)
ι (g − αι) ,
lim
x→ι−
U (x, ι) = s (ι)−
limx→ι− y (x)
ι (g − αι) ,
implying in
lim
x→ι−
y (x)− ι (g − αι) [s (ι)− s (γι)]
2
≥ y (ι) .
Thus, from these two necessary conditions, we obtain:
(25) y (ι) = − ι (g − αι) [s (ι)− s (γι)]
2
+ lim
x→ι−
y (x) .
Substituting in the indirect utility function, it follows that U (ι, ι) = limx→ι U (x, ι) .
Analogously, if [ι− ε, ι] is a discrete pooling set and (ι, ι+ ε] is a separating set
for some ε > 0, then
y (ι) = − ι (g − αι) [s (ι)− s (γι)]
2
+ lim
x→ι+
y (x) ,
U (ι, ι) = lim
x→ι
U (x, ι) .
¥
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Proof of Lemma 6:
From Remark 2, it follows that some types between bg
α
and g2α must be dis-
cretely pooled (since there is no continuous pooling in a quasi-separable equilib-
rium). Assume that some type in [ι0, γ (ι0)] is separated. Then, there must be a
ι ∈
£
ι0,
g
2α
¤
such that
£
ι, g2α
¤
is a discrete pooling set and [ι− ε, ι) is a separated
set for ε > 0. From equation 15, it follows that y (ι) < limx→ι0− y (x) (i.e., y
jumps upward when the types become separated). But this is not truth-telling
because the marginal cost of education is lower for ι + ε than for ι − ε for ε
suﬃciently small (thus, a type-(ι+ ε) individual would always prefer to get the
type-(ι− ε) individual’s contract). ¥
Proof of Lemma 7:
As γ (ι1) < ι0, ι1 is separated. Suppose a type ι1 worker chooses some
strictly positive education y˜ > 0. Then, according to equation (4), this worker’s
wages must be s (ι1) in any separating equilibrium (which is the lowest wage
since ι1 is the least productive type). However, she would receive a wage of at
least s (ι1) if she chose y = 0. As y = 0 implies in a lower signaling cost and
does not reduce her utility, she would be strictly better oﬀ by doing so. ¥
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